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Unfit to Plead or Unfit to Testify? 
R v Orr [2016] EWCA Crim 889 
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Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 
The appellant, a solicitor, was convicted of being concerned in a money laundering arrangement. He 
ǁas fiƌst tƌied iŶ ϮϬϭϮ, ďut the tƌial ǁas teƌŵiŶated ǁheŶ the appellaŶt ďeĐaŵe ͚uŶfit͛ shoƌtlǇ afteƌ 
his cross-examination had begun. A new trial commenced in October 2014. The appellant gave 
evidence-in-chief. However, on the day that the prosecution was due to commence cross-
examination, the appellant was unwell. The trial judge adjourned the trial to allow the appellant to 
be examined by a psychiatrist. The psychiatrist, applying the principles set out in the Mental Capacity 
AĐt ϮϬϬϱ, ǁas of the opiŶioŶ that the appellaŶt ǁas ͚uŶaďle to paƌtiĐipate iŶ his tƌial͛ ;at [ϭϰ]Ϳ. A 
seĐoŶd psǇĐhiatƌist iŶdiĐated that the appellaŶt͛s ŵeŶtal state ǁas suĐh that he ǁas Ŷoǁ ͚uŶaďle to 
giǀe eǀideŶĐe iŶ his oǁŶ defeŶĐe͛, ƌeŶdeƌiŶg hiŵ ͚uŶfit to plead͛ ;at [ϭϲ]Ϳ. CouŶsel foƌ the appellaŶt 
presented two options to the judge. The first option was to continue the trial with the appellant not 
undergoing cross-examination, but on the condition that the prosecution could not make a closing 
speeĐh. The seĐoŶd optioŶ ǁas to fiŶd the appellaŶt uŶfit to plead aŶd ĐoŵŵeŶĐe a ͚tƌial of the 
faĐts͛, folloǁiŶg the pƌoĐeduƌe set out iŶ s.ϰA of the CƌiŵiŶal PƌoĐeduƌe ;IŶsaŶitǇͿ AĐt ϭϵϲϰ ;͚the 
ϭϵϲϰ AĐt͛Ϳ.  
The trial judge eventually decided that the appellant was unfit to be cross-examined, but that he had 
been fit to give evidence-in-chief. The judge allowed the trial to continue, but ruled that the 
pƌoseĐutioŶ͛s ĐlosiŶg speeĐh ŵust Ŷot ƌefer to any subject that the appellant had not been in a 
position to meet in cross-examination. The judge directed the jury on the issue, including that the 
iŶaďilitǇ to giǀe eǀideŶĐe ǁas Ŷot the appellaŶt͛s fault aŶd that the juƌǇ should Ŷot speĐulate aďout 
the answers the appellant may have given had he been cross-examined (at [18]). 
The appellant was convicted and appealed on the following grounds: 
͚ϭͿ If the trial judge found the appellant was unable to be cross-examined by virtue of his 
inability to properly respond to questions asked in cross-examination, he should have ruled 
that he was not fit to be tried, discharged the jury from returning verdicts and then, 
proceeded to a determination by the jury as to whether the appellant had done the act or 
made the omission charged against him in accordance with section 4A(1) of the Criminal 
Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964; 
2)  IŶ the alteƌŶatiǀe the appellaŶt͛s ĐoŶǀiĐtioŶ is uŶsafe siŶĐe he did Ŷot ƌeĐeiǀe a faiƌ tƌial͛ ;at 
[19]). 
 
HELD, allowing the appeal, the way in which the case progressed had not disadvantaged the 
appellaŶt, as he had dealt ǁith the CƌoǁŶ͛s Đase iŶ detail iŶ his eǀideŶĐe-in-Đhief, the pƌoseĐutioŶ͛s 
closing speech had been restricted, and the jury had been directed on the issue (at [20]-[22]). 
However, the issue of fitness to plead had not been dealt with correctly. Fitness to plead cannot be 
deteƌŵiŶed ďǇ ƌefeƌeŶĐe to oŶlǇ paƌt of the tƌial pƌoĐess. ͚The ĐapaĐitǇ to ďe Đƌoss eǆaŵiŶed is paƌt 
aŶd paƌĐel of the defeŶdaŶt͛s aďilitǇ to giǀe eǀideŶĐe iŶ his oǁŶ defeŶĐe͛ ;at [Ϯϯ]Ϳ.  
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Section 35(1)(b) of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 provides support for the 
contention that a finding that the appellant was unfit to be cross-examined does not necessarily 
determine the question of fitness to plead ;at [Ϯϰ]Ϳ. “eĐtioŶ ϯϱ;ϭͿ;ďͿ Đateƌs foƌ situatioŶs ǁheŶ ͚the 
phǇsiĐal oƌ ŵeŶtal ĐoŶditioŶ of the aĐĐused ŵakes it uŶdesiƌaďle foƌ hiŵ to giǀe eǀideŶĐe͛, foƌ the 
puƌpose of deteƌŵiŶiŶg ǁhetheƌ adǀeƌse iŶfeƌeŶĐes ĐaŶ ďe dƌaǁŶ fƌoŵ the defeŶdaŶt͛s failure to 
testifǇ. The tƌial judge͛s ƌuliŶg ǁas aŵďiguous. Hoǁeǀeƌ, he appeaƌed to haǀe fouŶd that the 
appellant was unfit to plead, rather than it being undesirable for him to give evidence (at [27]).  
The criteria for determining fitness to plead were identified in the case of R v Pritchard (1836) 7 C & 
P 303 and subsequently endorsed and refined by the Court of Appeal. Fitness to plead includes a 
requirement that the defendant be able to give evidence in his own defence, meaning that he can 
understand the questions he is asked, apply his mind to answering them, and convey intelligibly the 
answers he wishes to give (R v M(John) [2003] EWCA Crim 3452 at [24]). The trial judge appeared to 
have found that the Pritchard criteria were met up until the point of cross-eǆaŵiŶatioŶ. This ͚ŵust 
iŵpliĐitlǇ ŵeaŶ that he fouŶd that theƌeafteƌ theǇ ǁeƌe Ŷot ŵet͛ ;at [Ϯϳ]Ϳ.  
Once the trial judge had determined that the appellant was no longer fit to participate in his trial, he 
should have followed the s.4A procedure. SectioŶ ϰA is a ͚statutoƌǇ ŵaŶdatoƌǇ ƌeƋuiƌeŵeŶt ǁhiĐh 
ĐaŶŶot ďe aǀoided ďǇ the Đouƌt͛s geŶeƌal disĐƌetioŶ to oƌdeƌ pƌoĐeediŶgs otheƌǁise, hoǁeǀeƌ 
ďeŶefiĐial to the defeŶdaŶt theǇ ŵight appeaƌ to ďe͛ ;at [ϯϬ]Ϳ. The Couƌt ĐoŶĐluded that ͚the juƌǇ 
should not have been allowed to return a verdict, other than a verdict of acquittal if they were not 
satisfied oŶ the eǀideŶĐe alƌeadǇ giǀeŶ iŶ the tƌial that the appellaŶt did the aĐt Đhaƌged agaiŶst hiŵ͛ 
(at [30]). 
 
COMMENTARY 
This is a complex case which highlights the confusion generated by both the current test for 
unfitness to plead and the procedure to be followed when the issue is raised. Three key issues arise 
from the judgment. First, the scope and interpretation of the test for unfitness; second, the stage at 
which a finding of unfitness to plead may be made; and third, the interplay between the unfitness to 
plead process and s.35 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. 
 
The test for unfitness 
 
In its 2016 report, Unfitness to Plead (Law Com. No.364), the Laǁ CoŵŵissioŶ Ŷoted that ͚[t]he 
current Pritchard test used to assess uŶfitŶess to plead … is Ŷot ĐoŶsisteŶtlǇ uŶdeƌstood oƌ applied 
ďǇ ĐliŶiĐiaŶs, legal pƌaĐtitioŶeƌs aŶd the Đouƌts͛ ;paƌa.ϭ.ϭϯͿ. IŶ the iŶstaŶt Đase, the fiƌst psǇĐhiatƌist 
applied the Đƌiteƌia set out iŶ the MeŶtal CapaĐitǇ AĐt ϮϬϬϱ ;͚the ϮϬϬϱ AĐt͛Ϳ aŶd ĐoŶĐluded that the 
appellant lacked the necessary decision-making capacity to participate in his trial. However, as the 
Law Commission pointed out, decision-making capacity does not form part of the current unfitness 
test, in contrast with the civil capacity test under the 2005 Act (Law Com. No.364, para 1.14). Rather, 
the Pritchard test foĐuses oŶ a defeŶdaŶt͛s iŶtelleĐtual aŶd ĐogŶitiǀe aďilities. The test steŵs fƌoŵ 
the nineteenth century case of R v Pritchard (1836) 7 C & P 303, but has been reframed and 
expanded in subsequent cases. In its current form it requires a defendant to be capable of doing the 
following: 
͚;ϭͿ uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg the Đhaƌges; ;ϮͿ deĐidiŶg ǁhetheƌ to plead guiltǇ or not; (3) exercising his 
right to challenge jurors; (4) instructing solicitors and counsel; (5) following the course of the 
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pƌoĐeediŶgs; ;ϲͿ giǀiŶg eǀideŶĐe iŶ his oǁŶ defeŶĐe.͛ ;R v M(John) [2003] EWCA Crim 3452 at 
[20]) 
In the present case, the Court of Appeal Ŷoted that ͚the ĐapaĐitǇ to ďe Đƌoss eǆaŵiŶed is paƌt aŶd 
paƌĐel of the defeŶdaŶt͛s aďilitǇ to giǀe eǀideŶĐe iŶ his oǁŶ defeŶĐe͛ ;at [Ϯϯ]Ϳ. The aďilitǇ to giǀe 
evidence means being able, 
 ͚(a) to understand the questions he is asked in the witness box, (b) to apply his mind to answering them, 
aŶd ;ĐͿ to ĐoŶǀeǇ iŶtelligiďlǇ to the juƌǇ the aŶsǁeƌs ǁhiĐh he ǁishes to giǀe͛ ;M(John) at [24]; Orr at [25]).  
The seĐoŶd psǇĐhiatƌist opiŶed that the appellaŶt ǁas uŶfit to plead ďeĐause he ǁas ͚uŶaďle to give 
eǀideŶĐe iŶ his oǁŶ defeŶĐe͛ ;at [ϭϲ]Ϳ, thus addƌessiŶg at least oŶe aspeĐt of the ƌefoƌŵulated 
Pritchard test. However, the evidence of the psychiatrists was not subject to detailed examination. 
The fiƌst psǇĐhiatƌist gaǀe ͚shoƌt oƌal eǀideŶĐe͛ ;at [14]), and the second produced a report, which 
appears to have simply been accepted by both parties and the judge.  
The Couƌt of Appeal suggested that the ͚uŶusual ĐiƌĐuŵstaŶĐes … ŵaǇ haǀe ŵeƌited a ŵoƌe detailed 
eǆploƌatioŶ of the psǇĐhiatƌists͛ ƌeasoŶs aŶd ĐoŶĐlusioŶs͛ ;at [Ϯϲ]Ϳ. IŶ R v Walls [2011] EWCA Crim 
443, the Court of Appeal suggested that psychiatric evidence should normally be scrutinised 
thoroughly where the issue of unfitness to plead is raised: 
͚[S]ave in clear cases, a court must rigorously examine evidence of psychiatrists adduced before them and 
then subject that evidence to careful analysis against the Pritchard criteria ... Save in cases where the 
uŶfitŶess is Đleaƌ, the faĐt that psǇĐhiatƌists agƌee is Ŷot eŶough…; a Đouƌt ǁould ďe failing in its duty to 
ďoth the puďliĐ aŶd a defeŶdaŶt if it did Ŷot ƌigoƌouslǇ eǆaŵiŶe the eǀideŶĐe aŶd ƌeaĐh its oǁŶ ĐoŶĐlusioŶ.͛ 
(Walls at [38])    
In particular, an issue that could have been explored in the present case was whether the appellant 
could have continued to give evidence if assisted by an intermediary (at [26]).  
The expansion of the use of special measures, including intermediaries, to assist vulnerable 
defeŶdaŶts to paƌtiĐipate iŶ the tƌial pƌoĐess is a ŵajoƌ plaŶk of the Laǁ CoŵŵissioŶ͛s pƌoposals for 
reform of the law of unfitness to plead. The aim is to ensure that a full criminal trial takes place 
ǁheƌeǀeƌ possiďle ďeĐause this is the ͚optiŵuŵ [pƌoĐess] foƌ a defeŶdaŶt faĐiŶg a ĐƌiŵiŶal 
allegatioŶ͛ ;Laǁ Coŵ. No.ϯϲϰ, paƌa Ϯ.ϮͿ.   The ĐuƌƌeŶt law facilitates this to an extent, as the Criminal 
Procedure Rules require that 
͚the Đouƌt ŵust take eǀeƌǇ ƌeasoŶaďle step― 
(a) to encourage and to facilitate the attendance of witnesses when they are needed; and 
(b) to facilitate the participation of any peƌsoŶ, iŶĐludiŶg the defeŶdaŶt͛ ;Cƌiŵ P‘ ϯ.ϵ;ϯͿͿ. 
“eĐtioŶ Ϯϵ of the Youth JustiĐe aŶd CƌiŵiŶal EǀideŶĐe AĐt ϭϵϵϵ ;͚the ϭϵϵϵ AĐt͛Ϳ, ǁhiĐh pƌoǀides foƌ 
the examination of a vulnerable witness to be conducted through an intermediary, does not extend 
to vulnerable defendants. Sections 33BA-33BB of the 1999 Act, which were introduced by the 
Coroners and Justice Act 2009, would enable a defendant who gives evidence to be examined 
through an intermediary, but these sections have not been brought into force. Nevertheless, a court 
may appoint an intermediary for a defendant relying on ͚its iŶheƌeŶt poǁeƌs aŶd uŶdeƌ the Criminal 
Procedure Rules to take suĐh steps as aƌe ŶeĐessaƌǇ to eŶsuƌe that he has a faiƌ tƌial͛ ;C v Sevenoaks Magistrates͛ 
Court [2009] EWHC 3088 (Admin)). A defence intermediary may be appointed for the whole trial or only 
to assist the defendant while he is testifying (R (on the application of OP) v Secretary of State for 
Justice [2014] EWHC 1944 (Admin)).  
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The provision of intermediaries for defendants has recently suffered a setback with the introduction 
of amendments to the Criminal Practice Directions in April 2016, which provide that defence 
iŶteƌŵediaƌies should ďe appoiŶted oŶlǇ ͚ƌaƌelǇ͛, aŶd appoiŶtŵeŶt foƌ the duƌatioŶ of a tƌial should 
ďe ͚eǆtƌeŵelǇ ƌaƌe͛ ;CPD, ϯF.ϭϯͿ. The Couƌt of Appeal ĐleaƌlǇ ĐoŶĐluded that the pƌeseŶt Đase, iŶ 
ǁhiĐh the issue of the appellaŶt͛s ĐapaĐitǇ to testifǇ aƌose paƌt ǁaǇ thƌough giǀiŶg his eǀideŶĐe, ǁas 
such a rare case that the judge ought to have considered intermediary provision.  Adjustments had 
already been made to the trial process to enable the appellant to participate. The provision of an 
intermediary ought at least to have been considered, particularly as the appellant had apparently 
iŶdiĐated ͚that he ǁould like to ĐaƌƌǇ oŶ giǀiŶg eǀideŶĐe aŶd to haǀe the oppoƌtuŶitǇ of aŶsǁeƌiŶg 
questions put iŶ Đƌoss eǆaŵiŶatioŶ͛ ;at [ϭϴ]Ϳ. Whetheƌ it ǁould haǀe ďeeŶ possiďle to oďtaiŶ a 
defence intermediary at short notice so as to enable the defendant to continue to testify and to be 
cross-examined is another matter. Difficulties in finding and funding defence intermediaries are well 
known (see, for example, R v Cox [ϮϬϭϮ] EWCA Ϯϰϵ. “ee also P. Coopeƌ aŶd D. Wuƌtzel, ͚A daǇ late 
and a dollar short: in search of an intermediary scheme for vulnerable defendants in England and 
Wales͛ [ϮϬϭϯ] Cƌiŵ L‘ ϰͿ. 
The Court of Appeal thought that the judge͛s ƌuliŶg oŶ the issue of uŶfitŶess to plead ǁas 
aŵďiguous. The judge fouŶd that the appellaŶt ǁas ͚Ŷot fit to uŶdeƌgo Đƌoss eǆaŵiŶatioŶ͛ ďut that 
͚up until that point (underlining supplied) the Pritchard Đƌiteƌia ǁeƌe ŵet͛ ;at Ϯϳ]Ϳ. IŶ the ǀieǁ of the 
Couƌt of Appeal, the judge had ͚theƌeďǇ iŵpliĐitlǇ deteƌŵiŶed that the appellaŶt ǁas Ŷo loŶgeƌ aďle 
to fully participate in his trial within the Pritchard ƌefiŶed Đƌiteƌia͛ ;at [Ϯϵ]Ϳ. IŶ ƌefeƌƌiŶg to ͚full 
paƌtiĐipatioŶ͛, the Couƌt adopted, iŶ paƌt, the teƌŵiŶologǇ used ďǇ the Laǁ CoŵŵissioŶ iŶ its ƌefoƌŵ 
pƌoposals. The CoŵŵissioŶ͛s pƌoposed test ǁould foĐus upoŶ the ͚ĐapaĐitǇ to paƌtiĐipate effeĐtiǀelǇ͛ 
(see Law Com. No.364, Chapter 3 and draft Bill Clauses 3(2) and 32(2)). The Commission favours 
incorporating a non-exhaustive list of relevant abilities, including the ability to give evidence.  
The CoŵŵissioŶ ƌejeĐted the suggestioŶ that theƌe ǁas a Ŷeed to eǆplaiŶ ǁhat ͚giǀiŶg eǀideŶĐe͛ 
ƌeƋuiƌes, as ͚the laĐk of elaboration does not appear to be problematic as the test is currently 
fƌaŵed͛ ;paƌa. ϯ.ϭϬϲͿ. The pƌeseŶt Đase ǁould suggest otheƌǁise. The Couƌt of Appeal aĐĐepted that 
the wording of s.35 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (see below) supports the 
pƌopositioŶ that a fiŶdiŶg that a defeŶdaŶt is ͚uŶfit to giǀe eǀideŶĐe iŶ Đƌoss eǆaŵiŶatioŶ does Ŷot 
ŶeĐessaƌilǇ deteƌŵiŶe the ƋuestioŶ of ͞fitŶess to plead͛͟ ;at [Ϯϰ]Ϳ. This suggests that soŵeoŶe ǁho is 
unfit to be cross examined may nevertheless be fit to plead, whereas being able to give evidence in 
his oǁŶ defeŶĐe ƌeƋuiƌes ͚the ĐapaĐitǇ to ďe Đƌoss eǆaŵiŶed͛  ;at [Ϯϯ]Ϳ. The Couƌt did Ŷot elaďoƌate 
upoŶ the distiŶĐtioŶ ďetǁeeŶ ͚fitŶess to giǀe eǀideŶĐe iŶ Đƌoss eǆaŵiŶatioŶ͛ aŶd ͚ĐapaĐitǇ to be 
Đƌoss eǆaŵiŶed͛, so peƌhaps soŵe guidaŶĐe oŶ this issue is Ŷeeded.  
  
The s.4A procedure 
An unusual aspect of the present case is that the issue of unfitness to plead arose as the appellant 
was about to be cross examined. This seems to have caused a degree of confusion as to the options 
available to the trial judge. The Court of Appeal observed that the judge could not have been 
assisted ďǇ the faĐt that juŶioƌ ĐouŶsel aŶd QueeŶ͛s CouŶsel foƌ the appellaŶt ŵade diffeƌeŶt, aŶd 
sometimes inconsistent, submissions as to whether and how the trial should proceed. They applied 
to disĐhaƌge the juƌǇ, iŶdiĐated that theǇ ǁould Ŷot ďe ͚iŵplaĐaďlǇ opposed͛ to the tƌial ĐoŶtiŶuiŶg 
and argued that the prosecution should be barred from making a closing speech, although the legal 
basis upon which the judge could so order is unclear. It appears that the judge was not asked to 
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formally rule on either the issue of unfitness to plead or the question whether a hearing under s.4A 
of the 1964 Act was required. 
The Court of Appeal proceeded on the basis that the judge had found that the appellant satisfied the 
Pritchard criteria at the point at which he was to be cross- examined. In doing so, the Court 
confirmed two important points. First, where a defendant satisfies the unfitness to plead test, the 
s.4A procedure must be followed; it is mandatory, not discretionary. Second, where a defendant 
ďeĐoŵes uŶfit paƌt ǁaǇ thƌough the pƌoĐeediŶgs, a s.ϰA heaƌiŶg ;ofteŶ kŶoǁŶ as a ͚tƌial of the faĐts͛Ϳ 
must commence at that stage.  
Under s.ϰ;ϰͿ of the ϭϵϲϰ AĐt, ͚the ƋuestioŶ of fitŶess to ďe tƌied shall ďe deteƌŵiŶed as sooŶ as it 
aƌises͛. WheŶ the issue aƌises at aŶ eaƌlǇ stage, hoǁeǀeƌ, the Đouƌt ŵaǇ postpoŶe the deteƌŵiŶatioŶ 
of fitŶess ͚uŶtil aŶǇ tiŵe up to the opeŶiŶg of the Đase foƌ the defeŶĐe͛ pƌoǀided ͚it is eǆpedieŶt to 
do so aŶd iŶ the iŶteƌests of the aĐĐused͛ ;s.ϰ;ϮͿͿ. If the question of unfitness is deferred to the 
opening of the defence case, the defence can make a submission of no case to answer, potentially 
resulting in an acquittal, before the issue of unfitness to plead has to be determined (s.4(3)). As the 
Law Commission explained in its consultation paper: 
 
͚It [is] theƌefoƌe possiďle foƌ the aĐĐused to aǀoid a fiŶdiŶg of uŶfitŶess to plead if the juƌǇ 
returned a verdict of acquittal at the close of the prosecution case, because they were 
directed to do so on the basis that there was insufficient evidence for a properly directed jury 
to convict. This [is] significant because it provide[s] an opportunity for the accused to avoid 
the outĐoŵe of a disposal uŶdeƌ seĐtioŶ ϱ.͛ ;Unfitness to Plead, Law Com. CP No.197, 
para.2.13)  
Once the court has found that a defendant is unfit to plead, s.4A is engaged and the trial cannot 
proceed or further proceed. Instead the jury must deteƌŵiŶe ǁhetheƌ the defeŶdaŶt ͚did the aĐt oƌ 
ŵade the oŵissioŶ Đhaƌged agaiŶst hiŵ as the offeŶĐe͛ ;s.ϰA;ϮͿ;ďͿͿ. IŶ the pƌeseŶt Đase, haǀiŶg 
implicitly found that the appellant was unfit to plead, the trial judge was obliged to convert the trial 
into a ͚tƌial of the faĐts͛. His failuƌe to folloǁ the ŵaŶdatoƌǇ pƌoǀisioŶs of s.ϰA ƌeŶdeƌed the 
conviction unsafe, despite the fact that the trial had otherwise been fair.  
  
Section 35 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 
The case raises a further important issue: the question of where the distinction lies between being 
͚uŶfit to plead͛ aŶd haǀiŶg a phǇsiĐal oƌ ŵeŶtal ĐoŶditioŶ ǁhiĐh ŵakes it ͚uŶdesiƌaďle͛ foƌ a 
defendant to give evidence for the purpose of s.35(1)(b) of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 
1994. The Court of Appeal referred to s.35(1)(b) as support for the contention that a finding that a 
defendant is unfit to give evidence in cross-examination does not necessarily determine the question 
of fitness to plead (at [24]). The Court also took the view that, at the heart of the respective 
ĐoŶteŶtioŶs of appellaŶt aŶd ƌespoŶdeŶt, ǁas the issue of ͚ǁhetheƌ the eǆteŶt of the appellaŶt͛s 
disaďilitǇ … [ƌeŶdeƌed] hiŵ ͞uŶfit to plead͟ ƌatheƌ thaŶ ŵakiŶg it ͞uŶdesiƌaďle foƌ hiŵ to giǀe 
evideŶĐe͛͟ ;at [Ϯϴ]Ϳ. This suggests that, iŶ the ĐoŶteǆt of the pƌeseŶt Đase, the Couƌt ŵaǇ haǀe 
ĐoŶsideƌed ͚uŶfit to ďe Đƌoss eǆaŵiŶed͛ as aŶalogous to ͚uŶdesiƌaďle to giǀe eǀideŶĐe͛, ƌatheƌ thaŶ 
͚uŶfit to plead͛. Hoǁeǀeƌ, the Couƌt did Ŷot ƌesolǀe the issue of where the distinction lies between 
͚uŶfit͛ aŶd ͚uŶdesiƌaďle͛. The judgŵeŶt is, theƌefoƌe, helpful oŶlǇ iŶ so faƌ as it ĐoŶfiƌŵs that theƌe is 
a difference between the two concepts. 
While there is set criteria for determining unfitness to plead, judges have wide discretion in applying 
s.35(1)(b). In R v Friend, the Court of Appeal declined to spell out a test, finding that the clarity of the 
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laŶguage of s.ϯϱ ͚is suĐh that it is Ŷot ŶeĐessaƌǇ to suppleŵeŶt the AĐt ǁith a test͛ ;[ϭϵϵϳ] ϭ WL‘ 
1433 (CA), 1443). In the same case, the Court indicated that most of those who satisfy s.35(1)(b) on 
account of a mental condition will also be unfit to plead (at 1440). In subsequent cases, s.35(1)(b) 
has been applied very restrictively  (see, for example, R (on the application of DPP) Kavanagh [2005] 
EWHC 820 (Admin); R v Ensor [2009] EWCA Crim 2519; R v D [2013] EWCA Crim 465). Thus, the grey 
area in which a defendant can be fit to plead, yet suffer from a mental or physical condition which 
makes it undesirable for them to give evidence, appears to be very small. Arguably, the courts 
should reconsider the need for a test or guidance for the application of s.35(1)(b). Although the trial 
judge͛s atteŶtioŶ ǁas Ŷot speĐifiĐallǇ dƌaǁŶ to s.ϯϱ, suĐh guidaŶĐe Đould haǀe ďeeŶ helpful in the 
present case; it could have assisted the judge in determining how to proceed and made his position 
less ambiguous.  
Guidance on the application of s.35(1)(b) could also clarify the relevance of factors which do not 
form part of the unfitness to plead test, such as the possible impact of testifying on the health or 
ǁellďeiŶg of the defeŶdaŶt, aŶd the defeŶdaŶt͛s aďilitǇ to giǀe eǀideŶĐe effeĐtiǀelǇ ;i.e. the ƋualitǇ 
of his eǀideŶĐeͿ. A Đleaƌ distiŶĐtioŶ ďetǁeeŶ ͚uŶfit to plead͛ aŶd ͚uŶdesiƌaďle to giǀe eǀideŶĐe͛ is also 
important because of the different outcomes. A finding that it is undesirable for a defendant to give 
evidence does not mean that the defendant is barred from giving evidence, nor that the trial cannot 
proceed in the usual way. It simply means that adverse inferences should not be drawn if he chooses 
Ŷot to testifǇ oƌ aŶsǁeƌ aŶǇ ƋuestioŶ. OŶ the otheƌ haŶd, if the defeŶdaŶt is uŶfit to plead, a ͚tƌial of 
the faĐts͛ ŵust ďe held, at ǁhiĐh the defeŶdaŶt͛s mens rea is not in issue, a different type of finding 
is reached than in ordinary trials, and judges have different (and limited) disposal options, including 
the option to make a hospital order. The significant difference between the two outcomes supports 
a contention that the distiŶĐtioŶ ďetǁeeŶ ͚uŶdesiƌaďle͛ aŶd ͚uŶfit͛ should ďe gƌeateƌ thaŶ eŶǀisaged 
in R v Friend.  A ďƌoad defiŶitioŶ of ͚uŶdesiƌaďle to giǀe eǀideŶĐe͛ ǁould eŶsuƌe that ǀulŶeƌaďle 
defendants who are fit to plead, yet suffer from a condition which may affect their testimony, are 
not disadvantaged by their decision to remain silent. In respect of the present case, given that the 
tƌial judge ĐoŶsideƌed the appellaŶt͛s ŵeŶtal health aŶ aďsolute ďaƌ to Đƌoss-examination, there can 
be little doubt that he was unfit to plead rather than it being undesirable for him to give evidence. 
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